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A Survey of Principal Procedural Elements Among
Stale Administrative Procedure Acts
T HE AREA OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, relatively contemporary
in origin,' has undergone tremendous expansion and now encom-
passes a considerable body of common law as well as statutory
enactments. As Mr. Justice Jackson has said, "The rise of admin-
istrative agencies has probably been the most significant legal trend
of the last century." 2 Concurrent with the rise in the number of
agencies has been the recent enactments of, and amendments to,
state administrative procedure acts.3 In view of the increasing
amount of case law and commentary in the field of administrative
law, this note confines itself to a survey of several of the principal
procedural elements commonly found in state administrative pro-
cedure acts.
The practical application of any administrative procedure
statute involves a consideration of at least the following principal
procedural elements: rule making, agency subpoena power, dis-
covery devices, hearing procedure for contested cases, the record
thereof, agency enforcement power, stay pending appeal, standing
to obtain judicial review, scope of judicial review, further judicial
appeal, and criminal or civil liability of administrators.
Although the administrative procedure acts reviewed, in general,
contain considerably more provisions than those listed above, it is
specifically because of the breadth of the area of state administra-
tive law that this note will consider only the aforementioned pro-
cedural elements, respectively.
1 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (1965).
2FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 497 (1952) (dissentin8 opinion).
3This article concerns itself with the following state administrative procedure acts: ALAS.
STAT. §44.62.010 et seq. (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§12-901 et seq., 41-1001 et
seq. (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §5-701 et seq. (Supp. 1971); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§1094.5 e seq. (1955); CAL. GOV'T, CODE §11500 et jeq. (1966); COLO. REv. STAT.
(Continued on next page)
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Rule Making
Review of Regulations After Promulgation
Of the state statutes reviewed in this section, all but Missouri's
and Iowa's provide for notice and a hearing of some type prior to
promulgation by the agency of an administrative regulation or rule.'
In Missouri, the regulation becomes cffective ten days after filing,5
and Iowa screens the regulation through that state's attorney general
and the departmental rules review committee which is composed of
members of the state senate and house.6 But what happens after the
rule or regulation has been filed and become effective? Can it be
repealed or amended? How and by whom? The primary portion
of this section will be devoted to providing the answers to these
questions.
Because one of the criteria used by courts to determine the
validity of an administrative rule or regulation is the sufficiency of
the justification for the exercise of the emergency rule making
procedure,7 it is important to review the procedures for emergency
promulgation found in the state administrative procedure acts. As
the name implies, emergency regulations are put into effect when
(Continued from preceding page)
ANN. §3-16-1 et seq. (1964); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. §4-41 et seq. (1969); D.C. CODE
ANN. §1-1501 et seq. (Supp. 1970); FLA. SWAT. ANN. §120.011 et seq. (1973); GA. CODE
ANN. §3A-101 et seq. (1968); HAwAII REv. STAT. §91-1 et seq. (1968); IDAHO CODE
§67-5201 at seq. (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN, STAT. ch. 110, §264 et seq. (1968), ch. 127
§263 ct jeq. (1967); IND. STAT. ANN. §§60-1501 at seq., 63-3001 ct seq. (1962); IOWA
CODE ANN. §17A.1 et seq. (1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. §77-415 et seq. (1969); Ky. REV.
STAT. §13.075 at seq. (1971); LA. REV. STAr. §49:95 at seq. (Supp. 1972); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. it. 5, §2301 et seq. (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §244 et ;eq. (Supp.
1972); MASS. LAWS ANN, ch. 30A, §1 at seq. (1966); MicH, COMp. LAWS §24.201 at
seq. (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §15.01 et seq. (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. §536.010
at seq. (1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §82-4201 et seq. (Supp. 1971); NEB. REV.
STAT. §84-901 at seq. (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. §233B.010 et seq. (1971); N.J. SWAT.
ANN. §52:14B-1 at seq. (1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. §4-32.1 et seq. (Supp. 1971); N.D.
CENT. CODE §28-32-01 et seq. (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §119.01 at seq. (Page
1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit, 75, §301 ct seq. (1965); ORE. REV, STAT. §183.310 et seq.
(1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §1710.1 a seq. (1962); R.I. GEN. LAws §42-35-1 ct
seq. (1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§1-26-1 at seq., 21-33-1 at seq. (Supp. 1972);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §801 et seq. (1972); VA. CODE ANN. §9-6.1 et seq. (1964); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §34.04.010 et seq. (1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. §29A-1-1 A seq.
(1971); WIS. STAT. ANN. §227.01 6t seq, (1957); WYO, STAT. ANN. §9-276.19 at seq.
(Supp. 1971). In view of the large number of statutory citations contained in this note,
the aforementioned state administrative procedure acts will hereinafter be cited by state
and section only (e.g., Ky. §13.125) unless otherwise necessary.
4 ALAS. §§44.62.190, 44.62.200, 44.62.210; ARIZ. §41-1002; ARK. §5-703; CAL. GOV'T.
CODE §§11423, 11425; CONN. §§4-42, 4-43; D.C. §1-1505; FLA. §120.041; GA. §3A-104;
HAWAII §91-3; IDAHO §67-5203; IND. §60-1504; KAN. §77-421; KY. §13.125; LA.
§49:953; ME. §§2351, 2354; MO. Art. 41 §9, Art. 41 §245; MASS. ch. 30A §§2, 3;
MiCn, §24.241; MONT. §82-4200; NEB. §84-907; NEv. §233B.060; N.3. §52:14B4;
N.M. §4-32-4; MINN. §15.0412; OHIO §119.03; OKLA. tit. 75 §303; ORE. §183.335; R.I.
§42-35-3; S. DAK. §1-26-4; VT. tit. 3 §803; VA. §9-6.4; WASH. §34.04.025; W. VA.
§29A-3-2, §29A-3-3; WIS. §227.015; WYO. §9-276.21.
,Mo. §536.020.
6IOWA §17A.2.
7See Declaratory Judgment, infra, pages 289-91.
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conditions require immediate effectiveness without the notice and
hearing required in the ordinary promulgation process. Of the acts
covered, only four do not have provisions for emergency promul-
gation ;S all the rest have some process by which the usual require-
ments of notice and hearing can be bypassed.'
The requisite conditions necessary to invoke an emergency pro-
cedure vary considerably. Some acts, such as those in Connecticut,
Ohio, Nebraska, and Minnesota allow broad discretion on the part
of agencies or the executive of the state to invoke the emergency
process. In Ohio and Nebraska the governor may invoke the emer-
gency powers if he determines there is a need for them, while in
Minnesota an agency, if the statute governing the agency permits,
may exercise its emergency powers whenever it feels a need to do
so.10 Connecticut also allows an agency to use its emergency pro-
cedure if it finds an emergency exists. Cooper, in his treatise, State
Administrative Law, expresses the fear that this short circuiting
could become abused and agencies might start invoking their emer-
gency powers when in fact no emergency exists.1
The usual rationale for invoking emergency rule making pro-
cedures is that the rule is necessary to preserve or to protect from
imminent peril the public health, safety, or welfare." Even with
this limitation the agency has wide discretion in using the emer-
gency procedure, because as the following two cases illustrate, there
seems to be a presumption that the agency's determination was cor-
rect. In Lacey v. Milk Control Comm'n,13 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court did not find the agency's determination that an im-
mediate adoption of the amendment (to a regulation) necessary for
the general welfare to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of dis-
cretion. However in a later case, Pioneer Liquor Mart., Inc. v.
Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission; 4 the same court said:
Ind., Me., Md., Mo.
9ALAS. §44.62.250; ArZ. §41-1003; ARK. §5-703; CAL. GOV'T. CODE §11421; CONN.
§447; D.C. §1-1505; FLA. §120.04; GA. §3A-104; HAWAII §91-3; IDAHO §67-5203; KAN.
§77-422; Ky. §13.085; LA. §49.953; MASS. ch. 30A §2; MICH. §24.248; MINN. §15.0412
Subd. 5; MONT. §82-4204; NEB. §84-907; NEv. §233B.060; N.J. §52:14B-4; N.M.
§4-32-4; OHio §119.03; OKLA. tit. 75 §303; ORE. §183.335; R.I. §42-35-3; S.D. §1-26-8;
VT. tit. 3 §803; VA. §9-6.5; WASH, §34.04.030; W. VA. §29A.3.5; WIS. §227.027; WYO.
§9-276.21.
1 CONN. §4-47; MINN. §15.0412; NEa. §84-907; OHIO §119.03.
'1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 201 (1965). Cooper feels that the lack of
criteria may allow agencies or the executive to effectively deny the right to hearing provided
for in the regular rule-making procedure by arbitrarily using emergency process.
"ALAS. §44.62.250; ARIZ. §41-1003, ARK. §5-703(b); CAL. GOVT. CoDE §11421(b),
D.C. §1-1505(c); FLA. §120.04(3); GA. §3A-104(b); HAWAII §91-3; IDAHO §67-
5203(b); KAN. §77-422; LA. §49-953; MASS. ch. 30A §2(3); MICH. §24.248; MONT.
§82-4204; N.J. §52:14B-4; N.M. §4-32-4(b); OKLA. tit. 75 §303(b); R.I. §42-35-3; S.
D. §1-26-8; VT. tit. 3 §803(b); VA. §9-6.5, WASH. §34.04.030; W. VA. §29A.3.5;
Wis. §227.027.
14 350 Mass. 1, 212 N.E.2d 549 (1965).
13 340 Mass. 681, 166 N.E.2d 362, 364 (1960).
1973]
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We recognize that "emergency" findings . . .must be care-
fully scrutinized because if unwarrantably made they may
lead to improper denial of public hearings or comment on
regulations ... and possibly to other serious abuse.' s
Even so, the court upheld the "emergency" regulation despite
the admittedly meager character of the commission's statement of
the "emergency." In order to preclude abuses of emergency dis-
,cretion, the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act
(RMSAPA) requires that a statement of findings or reasons for
the agency's use of the emergency process accompany the rule
when it is filed. 16 The above cited Massachusetts cases show that
this is not the complete answer. In Kansas, a state rules and reg-
ulations board consisting of the attorney general, the revisor of
statutes, and the secretary of state determines in each case if an
emergency exists.1 7 Another approach is that taken by Alaska and
Kentucky, both of which have a statement of policy that "[Emer-
gencies] must be held to a minimum and are rarely found to exist."'8
Once promulgated, the regulation usually remains in effect for
a period limited by the statute. In most states this period varies
from 60 to 120 days. There is a danger that an emergency regula-
tion can become permanent if an unlimited number of renewals is
allowed.19 To prevent this denial of the right to notice and hearing,
the RMSAPA provides for a 120 day effective period with one 30
day renewal." Alaska takes a different approach by requiring that
the agency comply with the notice and hearing provisions of the
rule has expired or before the emergency regulation is repealed.2
rule has expired or before the emergency rgulation is repealed
1
To convert an emergency regulation to a standard regulation most
states require compliance with the standard requirements of their
acts' rule-making process. This is accomplished in two ways: either
during the effective period of the emergency regulation notice and
hearing are offered on the emergency regulation; or an identical
standard regulation is promulgated. The latter method is the pre-
dominant one in acts which mention conversion of emergency
regulations.
111d. at 7,212 N.E.2d. at 555.
11 REWiSED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURn ACT §3(b) (hereinafter cited as
RMSAPA).
'7 KAN. §77-423.
" ALAS. §44.62.270; Ky. §13.085.
9 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 202 (1965).
"1 RMSAPA §3 (b),
E ALAS. §44.62.250.
12ALAS. §44.62.250; CAL. Gov'T. CODE §11421(b); FLA. §120.04(3); GA. §3A-104(b);
HAWAII §91-3; IDAHO §67-5203(b); LA, §49:953; MASS, ch. 30A §2(3); MICH.
§24.248; MINN. §15.0412; MONT. §82-4204; Nnv. §233B.060; N.M. §4-32-4(B); OHIO
§119.03(F); OKLA, tic. 75 §303(b); ORE. §183.335; R.I. §42-35-3; VT. tit. 3 §803(b);
VA. §9-6.5; W. VA. §29A-3-5; WYo. §9-276.21.
[Vol, 22:281
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Legislative Review
At least 12 states provide for some manner of review of the
regulations made by administrative agencies or departments, by the
state legislature or a committee composed of some of its members.
In Alaska an agency or departmental regulation may be an-
nulled by a concurrent resolution of both houses. By requiring a
resolution instead of a bill, this law eliminates the need for ap-
proval by the governor when annulling an administrative regulation.
In addition, Alaska requires an annual review of all regulations by
the legislative council to see if the legislative intent is followed. The
legislative council then sends a comprehensive report, with recom-
mendations, to the legislature at the start of the regular session."
Connecticut's legislative review is provided by a combination of
an interim legislative regulation review committee and a biannual
review of all current regulations by the general assembly. A copy
of each new regulation is given to the committee for study, during
which public hearings may be held at the discretion of the commit-
tee. If the committee disapproves the regulation, it is void." The
assembly's review process consists of sending all effective regula-
tions to the appropriate committee for consideration and hearings.
The regulation can be disapproved by resolution and made void. The
assembly may also, by resolution, reverse a vote of disapproval by
the interim committee.0
In Iowa, where there is no provision for notice and hearing in
the administrative rule making process, there is, however, a de-
tailed provision for control by the legislature and its committees of
this process. A bipartisan legislative committee composed of three
state senators and three representatives designated as the depart-
mental rules review committee is established.2 6 This committee pub-
lishes notice of public meetings which it holds so that any interested
party may be heard or present evidence concerning any proposed
regulation.27 The committee may make recommendations to the
agency but the agency is free to accept or reject them.28 However
the agency is required to submit the committee's findings and an
attorney general's opinion along with the proposed regulation when
it is filed.29 All the rules are then referred to the assembly and are
3ALAS. §44.62.320.
24 CoNN. §448.
- CoN,. §4-49.
2 IOWA §17A.2.
27 IOWA §17A.3.
2JowA §17A.7. See also 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRARIvE LAW 225 (1965).
29 l owA §17.8.
19731
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studied by the appropriate legislative committee of that body. The
committees then make their report and the assembly may proceed
by law to overcome any objection of the committees.30
Idaho requires that all rules be sent to the House and Senate
before the first day of the session following promulgation. 1 The
rules are then referred to standing committees in the same manner
as bills. If the committee finds that the rule violates the legislative
intent of the statute under which the rule was made, a resolution
may be adopted amending or modifying it.32
In 1972, Kentucky passed a law" providing for review of every
regulation except emergency regulations by a permanent subcom-
mittee of the legislative research commission known as the admin-
istrative regulation review subcommittee. If they find that the
regulation does not conform to the statutory authority of the agency
or does not coincide with the legislative intent, and the agency
refuses to revise or amend it, the regulation is transmitted to the
clerks of the state House and Senate for such action as the legisla-
tive bodies may deem appropriate. 4
Michigan provides for several methods of legislative review. A
legislator can have copies of all proposed regulations or amendments
delievered to him upon his request.'5 This allows him to review a
rule and determine if he would like to take any action which is
allowed under §24.251. All regulations go through the joint com-
mittee on administrative rules. The committee either approves or
disapproves the regulation. If the latter, the joint committee will
introduce a concurrent resolution to the legislature which must then
be adopted within three months from the time the proposed regula-
tion was submitted or the agency can proceed with adoption.
36 If
the joint committee or a member of the legislature believes the
promulgated rule is unauthorized, or does not conform with the
legislative intent, or is inexpedient, he may either introduce a con-
current resolution or introduce a bill to repeal the rule." This allows
a wide degree of legislative scrutiny and provides more legislative
control than a mere screening through a committee of some type.
3IOWA §17.10.
31 IDAHO §67-5217.
2 1DAHO §67-5218.
"Ky. §13.087 (Supp. 1972).
3
4 d.
'
5 MICH. §24 .24 1a.
3 6MIcH. §24.245.
37 MICH. §24.251.
[Vol. 22:281
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol22/iss2/7
SURVEY - STATES' A.P.A.'e
The Nebraska statutes provide that a copy of the agency's
rules currently in force must be filed prior to the start of the reg-
ular legislative session. The legislature then considers the rules and
may reject, change, alter, amend, or modify them in any manner it
deems advisable, 8 The statute in Oklahoma, like the Nebraska
statute, requires an annual review of all current rules by the legis-
lature and also requires all newly promulgated rules to be reviewed
within ten days after adoption or ten days after convening the next
session. The rule can be disapproved by adoption of a joint resolu-
tion and failure to disapprove within thirty days of submission for
review results in approval by the legislature." However, in Oklahoma
Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Welch,"0 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that this approval by silence did not give validity to a
regulation which the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board was not
empowered to adopt.
The Virginia act provides that any rule shall be null and void
after either house of the General Assembly adopts a resolution de-
claring it so and prohibits adoption of any rule having substantially
the same object until the General Assembly repeals the resolution.4'
In Washington, all rules are subject to legislative review to deter-
mine if they conform with the intent of the authorizing statutes.
This is in addition to a provision for a biennial review of agency
regulations to see if the legislative intent is being followed. 41
Two states have repealed their laws providing for legislative
review. In Kansas the law was seldom used because there was no
provision for routine submissions to the legislature.43 The Wisconsin
statute provided for a joint legislative committee which reviewed
administrative rules and regulations but had advisory powers only.M
Although several states have repealed their laws providing for
legislative review of administrative rules, it seems that legislative
review remains a viable means of checking the power of the execu-
tive agencies and, in addition, provides close and constant contact
between the agencies and the legislative branch.
38 NEB. §84.904.
39 OKLA. tit. 75 §308.
40446 P.2d 287 (Okla. 1968).
41 VA, §9-6.9(dM,
12 WASH. 34.04.160.
43 KAN. LAWS 1939 ch. 308, KAN. LAws 1965 ch. 506 §40. See also 1 F. COOPER, STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 225 (1965).
44 WIS. §227.041 repealed by L 1965 C. 659 §21 enacted Sept. 1, 1966. See also 1 F. COOPER
STATS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 229 (1965).
1973]
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Internal Review by the Agency
After a rule has been promulgated by the agency and has
passed any required review by the legislature, the next question to
be asked by those affected will probably be: What does it mean
and how will it affect the petitioner? Is there any procedure to
modify or repeal or declare invalid a particular rule? These ques-
tions may be answered in two ways, either by having the agency
respond through a process of internal review or by petitioning a
court for a declaratory judgment. Because agency review is in most
instances less costly, easier, and sometimes required by the courts
before they will consider a petition for declaratory judgment, this
process will be considered first.
There are three basic processes by which agencies review
existing regulations. They are the informal advisory opinion, the
petition for promulgation, amendment, or repeal, and the petition
for a declaratory ruling. The informal advisory opinion process is
by far the easiest. All that is needed is a call or letter requesting
an opinion by the agency. In most cases these opinions are not
legally binding on either party and the agency is free to change its
position. As Cooper suggests, the convenience of these opinions may
in most instances outweigh the disadvantages. 5
If a person is not satisfied by the results of an informal opinion,
he may pursue one of the two formal methods of review. Of the
states reviewed, six provided no statutory method for internal
review.4 Of these states at least one, Kansas, has some form of
agency internal review not found in its general administrative pro-
cedure act because its statute for declaratory judgment requires the
plaintiff to first request the agency to pass upon the validity of the
regulation in question. 47 The petition for promulgation, amendment,
or repeal is found in all states having a formal internal review
method." This process is available to any interested person and is
initiated by filing the petition. One of the problems encountered in
using this method is the agency failing to take action on the peti-
tion. As a remedial measure, the drafters of the RMSAPA added
a provision requiring the agency to deny the petition in writing or
initiate rule making proceedings. 4 This is the approach taken by
45 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 245-46 (1965).
46 Ala., Fla., Ind., Kan., Ky., Ohio.
"41KAN. 77-434.
4ALAs. §44.62.220; ARK. §5-703, CAL. GOV'T. CODE §11426; CONN. §4-4; D.C. §1-1505;
GA. §3A-109; HAWAII §91-6; IDAHO §67-5206; LA. §49:953; ME. tit. 5 §2354; MD. Art.
41 §248; MASS. ch. 30A §4; MICH. §24.238; MINN. §15.0415; MO. §536.040; MONT.
§824207; NEB. §84-910; NEv. §233B.100; N.J. §52:14B-8; N.M. §4-32-7; OKLA. tit. 75
§305; ORE. §183.390; R.I. §42-35-6; SD. §1-26-13; VT. tit. 3 §806; VA. §9-6.8;
WASH, §34.04.06; W. VA. §29A-3-6; Wis. §227.015; WYo. §9-276-24.
49 RMSAPA §6.
[Vol. 22-281
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Alaska in §44.62.230 of its act. A much more stringent provision
is found in the Wisconsin act. To prevent the agency from having
to answer frivolous petitions, the right to petition is restricted to
any municipality, any corporation, or any five or more persons having
an interest in the rule. The petition must state the substance or
nature of the rule requested, the reasons for the request, the peti-
tioners' interest in it, and references to the authority of the agency
to take the action requested. In return, the agency must, within a
reasonable period, either deny in writing the petition or initiate the
rule-making procedure. The denial must be accompanied by a state-
ment of justification. 0 It is possible, therefore, by using this type
of petition to have the agency review a current regulation by
petitioning for an amendment or repeal and if the Wisconsin or
RMSAPA approach is used the agency will have to give reasons for
its denial and do it within a reasonable time.
In addition to the above petition, a number of state statutes
provide declaratory rulings by the agency. 51 Most of these statutes
allow any interested person or party to file such petition. New Mexico
requires the party filing to have interests, rights, or privileges which
are immediately affected. 2 Where the scope of the inquiry is men-
tioned, such scope includes the applicability of the rule or the statutory
provision to any person, property, or state of facts.5 3 Under the
RMSAPA, the agencies provide their own rules and procedures for
filing these petitions, and the declaratory ruling or a refusal to
issue same is subject to judicial review just as the decisions in con-
tested casesYs This, like the provision in the petition for adoption,
requiring an answer within thirty days forces the agencies to take
action on petitions submitted to them and allows persons to go to the
courts with an agency's final decision.
Declaratory Judgments
In order for a party to obtain a judicial determination of the
applicability or validity of an agency regulation, many states pro-
vide for a declaratory judgment action in their administrative pro-
50 WIs. §227.015.
5 ARK. §5-706; D.C. §1-1508; GA. §3A-112; HAWAII §91-8; IDAHO §67-5208; LA. §49:962;
ME. tit. 5 §2402; MD. Art. 41 §250; MAss. ch. 30A §8; MICE. §24.263; MONT. §82-
4218; NEB. §84-912; NEV. §233B.120; N.M. §4-32-9; OKLA. tit. 75 §307, OR . §183.410;
R.I. §42-35-8; S.D. §1.26-15; VT. tit. 3 §808; WASH. §34.04.080; W. VA. §29A-4-1.
52 N.M. §4-32-9.
3Ax, §5-706; D.C. §1-1508; GA. §3A 112; HAWAII §91 8; IDAHO §67-5208; LA. §49:962;
Ma. tit. 5 §2402; MD. Art. 41 §250; MASS. ch. 30A §8; MICa. §24,263; NsB. §84-912;
NJ. §52:14B-8; OKLA. tit. 75 §307; OtxE. §183.410; S.D. §1-26-15; VT. tit. 3 §808;
WASH. §34.04.080; W. VA. §29A-4-1.
RMSAPA §8.
1973]
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cedure acts.55 These provisions vary widely from state to state. The
requirements for standing, for instance, range from any interested
person56 or any person except the agency making the rule,57 to
those who can show that a review of the rule by the court in con-
junction with a review of a final agency decision in a contested
hearing would not provide an adequate remedy and would inflict
irreparable injury.58 The most common provision requires that the
party filing have his legal rights or privileges impaired or threat-
ened by the rule or its threatened application. 9
Some states require the party filing for declaratory judgment
to first exhaust all administrative remedies or to have the agency
first pass on the regulations. However, this requirement may be
bypassed if the courts determine that the interests of justice re-
quire it." In a New Jersey case, the court held that the rule
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies "... is neither
jurisdictional nor absolute."'" In the light of this and other decisions
concerning the exhaustion of administrative remedies before appeal
to the courts in contested cases, 2 it seems that the requirement is
not iron clad and that the courts will not demand that a party
engage in an obviously fruitless proceeding with an agency before
petitioning the courts for relief.
Cooper mentions five tests used by the courts to determine the
validity of rules. They are:
1. A rule is invalid if it exceeds the authority conferred by
statute;
2. A rule is invalid if it conflicts with the governing statute;
8. Rules are void if they extend or modify the statute;
4. Rules having no reasonable relationship to statutory pur-
pose are void;
11 ALAS. §44.62.300; AnIz. §41-1007; ARK. §5-705; CAL. Gov'T. COD §11440; D.C. §1-1508;
FLA. §120.3011; GA. §3A-111; H-AWAII §91-7; IDAHO §67-5207; KAN. §77434; LA.
49:963; MD. Art. 41 §249; MICH. §24.264; MINN. §15.0416; Mo, §536.050; MONT. §82-
4219; NEB. §84-911; NEV. §233B.110; N.j. §§52:14B-8, 52:14B-12; N.M. §4-32-8; OHIO
§119.11; OKLA. tit. 75 §306; R.I. §42-35-7; S.D. §1-26-14; VT. tit. 3 §807; VA, §9-6.9;
WASH. §34.04.070; W. VA. §29A-4-2; WIs. §227.05.
11 See ALAS. §44.62.300; CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §1440; HAWAII §91-7.
s
7 W.VA. §29A.4.2.
BLA. §49:963.
5 ARIz. §41-1007; GA. §3A-111; IDAHO §67-5207; KAN. §77434; MICH. §24.264; MD.
Art. 41 §249; MONT. §82-4219; NEB. §84-911; NEV. §233B.110; MaNN. §15.0416; R.I.
§42-35-7; S.D. §1-26-14; VT. tit. 3 §807; WASH. §34.04.070.
50Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.J. Super. 63, 274 A.2d 832 (1971).
61 Essex Council No.1 N.J. Civil Sert. Asa'n. Inc., v. Gibson, 114 NJ. Supee. 576, 277 A.2d
562 (1971).
62 See Scope Judicial Review, infra, pages 308-14.
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5. Courts will set aside rules deemed to be unconstitutional
or arbitrary or unreasonable.63
These tests have been condensed in several statutes to three:
1. A rule will be declared invalid if it violates the consti-
tutional provisions;
2. A rule is invalid if it exceeds the statutory authority of
the agency;
3. A rule is void if it was not adopted in compliance with
statutory rule-making procedures or if the agency de-
clared an emergency when in fact none existed."
In other statutes the scope of the judicial review is generally given
as looking into the validity or applicability of the rule. 5 These are
the methods by which a party may contest a regulation after it has
been promulgated, but before it results in a contested case.
Subpoena Power
The need to provide for compulsory process to obtain evidence
has resulted in a fairly wide-spread grant of subpoena power under
the various administrative procedure acts." A legislative grant of
such power is necessary as an agency, by itself, has no inherent
right to issue subpoenas. 7 Where the requisite grant exists, how-
ever, it may be as comprehensive as the legislature deems fit to
make it.'" Often, where the legislature in the administrative pro-
cedure act has granted the basic subpoena power to the agencies, it
also has provided for an enforcement power through the courts.69
Generally, the agency's power to issue subpoenas and subpoenas
duces tecum is limited to contested cases where the agency is func-
tioning in its quasi-judicial role and no such power exists in con-
', 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw 250-62 (1965),
"ALAS. §44.62.300; ARK. §5-705; CAL. GovT. CODE §11440; HAWAII §91-7; KAN. §77-
434; LA. §49:963; MD. Art. 41 §249; NEB. §84-911; VA. §9-6.9; WASH. §34.04.070;
Wis. §227.05.
"ALAS. §44.62.300; ARiz. §41-1007; FLA. §120.30(1); LA. §49:963; R.I. §42-35-7; W.
VA. §29A-4-2.
66ALAs. §44.62.430; ARIZ. §41-1010; ARK. §5-708; CAL, GOV'T. CODE §11510; GA.
§3A-114; HAWAII §92-12; IND. §63-3021; LA. §49:956; ME. cit. 5, 2406; MAss. ch. 38,
§12; MICH. §24.273; Mo. §536.077; MONT. §82-4211; NEB. §84-914; N.D. §28-32-10;
OHIO §119.09; OKLA. tit. 75, §315(2); ORE. §183.440; PA. tit. 71, §200; S.D. §1-26-19.1;
WASH. §34.04.090; WYO. §9-276.25.
'
7Commission ex rel. Margiorti V. Orsini, 363 Pa.259, 81 A.2d 891 (1951).
68 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Smith, 216 Ore. 605, 340 P.2d 960 (1959).
9ARiz. §41-1010; ARK. §5-709; GA. §3A-114; HAWAII §92-12; IND. §63-3021; LA.
§49:956; ME. tit. 5, 2406; MASS. ch. 38, §12; MICH. §24,273; Mo. §536.077; MONT.
§82-4211; N.D. §28-32-10; OHIO §119.09; OKLA. tit. 75, §315; ORE. §183.440; S.D.
§1-26-19.1; WASH. §34.04.105; WYo, §9-276.25.
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nection with its rule making process." When exercised within its
statutory bounds, the power to subjoena witnesses and to force
production of evidence belongs to any party to the proceedings pro-
vided the subpoena itself is issued in the name of the agency. 1 An
agency's refusal to issue a requested subpoena has been held to be
immediately subject to judicial review.",
It should be noted that a few of the acts which define the
scope of the agency's subpoena power do not grant that power but
simply specify that the acts' provisions apply only to those agencies
granted the subpoena power by law or by special statute."
Discovery
The right of administrative agencies to utilize discovery pro-
cedures is generally confined, by statute, to contested cases or ad-
judicatory hearings before the agency.7 4 Although the use of the
subpoena is the primary information gathering device available to
the agency where authorized by statute, the power to authorize the
taking of depositions also is granted by the legislature in many of
the acts."$
This power, as commonly expressed, permits the agency to take
depositions as in civil cases7 6 or, more simply, to order and obtain
any deposition the agency deems necessary.77 At least one court has
found that the legislative purpose behind granting the right to take
depositions is not for the usual discovery purposes but exists to
enable the agency to secure evidence for use at the hearing.8 This
view seems somewhat justified in the Arizona discovery provision
which permits depositions only of witnesses who are either unable
to attend the hearing or who cannot be subpoenaed."
" But see WASH. §34.04.105 (1) (power to subpoena witness and evidence for rulemaking
hearing).
71ALAS. §44.62.430; ARK. §5-709(c); CAL. GOV'T. CODE §11510; IN. §63-3021; LA.
§49:956; ME. tit. 5, §2406; MASS. ch. 38, §12; MICH. §24.273; Mo. §536.077; MONT.
§82-4211; N.D. §28-32-09; OHIO §119.09; OKLA. tit. 75, §315; ORE. §183.440; WASH.
§§34.04.090, 34.04.105; WYO. §9-276-25.
7 Shively v. Stewart, 65 Ca1.2d 475, 421 P.2d 65, 55 Cal. Rptr 217 (1966).
"3See, e.g., FLA. §120.25; W. VA. §29A-5-1.
74ALAS. §44.62.440; ARIZ. §41-100; CAL. GOVT. CODE §11511; FLA. §120.25; GA.
§3A-114; IND. §63-3007; LA. §49:956; Mo. §536.073; MONT. §82-4211; NED. §84-914;
N.M. §4-32-1OA5; N.D. §28-32-09; OHIO §119.09; OKLA. tit. 75, §315; ORE. §183.425;
S.D. §1-26-19.2; WASH. §34.04.090; W. VA. §29A-5-1c; WYO. §9-276.25.
76 ALAS. §44.62.440; CAL. GOV'T. CODE §11511; IA. §49:956; Mo. §536.073; NEB. §84-914;
N.D. §28-32-09; OHIo §119.09; ORE. §183.425; S.D. §1-26-19.2; WYO. §9-276.25.
7FLA. §120.25; GA, §3A-114; IND. §63-3007; MONT. §82-4211; OKLA. tit. 75, 9315;
WAS H. §34.04.090; W. VA. §29A-5-1c.
78 Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal.2d 475, 421 P.2d 65, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1966).
79 ARIZ. §41.1010.
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At present, two of the states, Michigan and Louisiana, permit
agencies bound by their administrative procedure acts to adopt the
necessary discovery procedures for themselves." New Mexico and
Wyoming seem to have solved the problems that the granting of
such unlimited agency discretion would produce by providing for
the availability of all discovery procedures otherwise available in
court on demand by any party.8' It should be noted that only a few
of the statutes specifically provide for an agency right to compel
compliance with its discovery procedures by court order.82
Hearing Procedures for Contested Cases
Composition of Adjudicatory Body - Who Is to Hear the Case
The question of who is to hear the contested case is one which
has not been met by the vast majority of state statutes. In most
cases the omission has been deliberate, primarily because of the
various approaches to the problem taken by each agency within
the state.'3 Some states provide that all agency members shall hear
a case or, in the alternative, that their hearing duties may be
delegated to a hearing officer or to certain members of the agency.' 4
Three states, however, specifically provide for the appointment of
a qualified hearing officer.' 5 Of these, the California approach is the
most thorough. The hearing is conducted by a hearing officer who
is one of a group of such officers on the staff of the state's Office
of Administrative Procedure. In order to qualify as such, the hear-
ing officer must have been admitted to the practice of law in Cali-
fornia for at least five years and possess any additional qualifica-
tions required by the State Personnel Board."' The agency decides
whether the hearing officer is to hear the case alone or in conjunc-
tion with the agency members. In the former situation, after the
ease is heard, the hearing officer prepares a decision which the
agency may adopt or modify after affording the parties opportunity
to be heard. In the latter situation, the hearing officer presides at
the hearing, regulates its course, and assists the agency members."
The Alaska statute is similar to California's, requiring the
Governor to appoint qualified, impartial hearing officers with suffi-
cient experience in the general practice of law to conduct hearings.08
"ILA, §49;956; MicH, §24.274.
N.M. §4-32-10A; WYO. §9-276.25.
82 CAL. GOV'T. CoDE §11507.6; MoNT, §82-4211; Wyo, §9-276.25.
31 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 331 (1965).
"4E.g., ARK. §5-709(b); IND. §63-3007; MICH. §24.279; WYO. §9-276.30(a).
"ALAS. §44.62.350; CAL. GOVT. CODE §11502; OHIO §119.09
"6 CAL. GOV'T. CODE §11902.
'
7 CAL. GOv'T. CODE §115 12.
8ALAS. §44.62.350.
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Ohio allows the agency itself to appoint a referee or examiner. Such
individual must have been admitted to the practice of law in the
state and possess any additional qualifications the agency requires. 9
Right to Counsel
In an appearance in a contested case before the above-men-
tioned hearer or hearers, a party to such case will most likely wish
to be represented by counsel. Although the majority of states do
not expressly grant this right in their administrative procedure
acts, most courts nevertheless allow the party to have legal counsel.
Cooper believes that this is a result of widespread recognition by
state courts of an individual's right to counsel in any proceeding
affecting his rights,90 as established by Powell v. Alabama.1 The
Powell doctrine was specifically applied to an administrative pro-
ceeding in Goldberg v. Kelly, 2 in which the court held, inter alia,
that a welfare recipient had the right to be represented by counsel
at a hearing to determine whether his benefits would continue.
Foregoing reliance on state agencies to enforce the above de-
cision absent an express statutory provision, several states have
enacted statutes unqualifiedly granting the right to be represented
by counsel to a party appearing in a contested case before a state
agency.3 Other states grant the right by implication, generally in
a provision that notice of a final decision or order in a contested
case is to be served on a party or his attorney of record. 4
No state imposes upon itself or its agencies the duty of pro-
viding counsel for an indigent party to an administrative proceed-
ing, and Montana specifically disclaims any such obligation. 5
However, Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent in Goldberg, indicates
that if there is a right to counsel in an administrative proceeding,
logically the policy of Gideon v. Wainwright O should apply, requir-
ing the state to furnish counsel free of charge to an indigent party.
To the authors' knowledge this issue has not yet been raised.
89 OHIO § 119.09.
9 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 328-29 (1965).
91 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
02 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
93ARIz. 141-1010; ARK. §5-709(a); CAL. GoV'T. COD §11505(b); D.C. §1-1509(b);
FLA. §120.26(6); MONT. §82-4221; N.M. §4-32-11F; OHIO §119.03; OKLA. §310(5).
94 IDAHO §67.5215; ORE. §183.470; R.I. §45-35-12; VT. tit. 3, 812; WASH. §34.04.120;
W. VA. §29A-5-3; Wis. §227.14; WYO. §9-276.28.
95 MONT. §82-4221.
96372 U.S. 335 (1963). This concept is furthered by the Court's decision in Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), expanding the indigent's right to counsel to specified mis-
demeanors as well as felonies.
97 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 279 (1970).
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Right to Public Hearing
Only a few states specifically grant the right to an open or
public hearing,98 and the Alaska statute states that a public hear-
ing is not required." According to Cooper, generally, administra-
tive hearings are open to the public, although he suggests that an
agency's discretion to open or close a hearing should be congruent
to that of a trial court.100
Procedure During Hearing
In most states the hearing itself is conducted in accordance
with the agency's own rules, each state's administrative procedure
act requiring each agency to ". . . adopt rules of practice setting
forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal pro-
cedures available . . .,.
A few states prescribe the manner in which such rules are to
be administered. Usually the agency, an agency member, or the
hearing examiner is empowered to rule on offers of proof, regulate
the course of the hearing, and dispose of procedural requests and
similar matters. 102
The California and Alaska statutes on hearing procedure pro-
vide, alternatively, for two types of hearings. In the first type, the
hearing officer hears the case alone and exercises all regulatory
powers over the course of the proceedings. In the second type, the
officer hears the case together with the agency, ruling on the ad-
missibility of evidence and advising the agency on matters of law,
while the agency members exercise all other regulatory powers (e.g.,
regulating the course of the hearing, ruling on offers of proof, etc.).
However, if the agency so desires, it may delegate all, or any part
of such powers to the hearing officer. 03
58 AsIZ. §41-1010; FLA. §120.22 (but public hearing not required; waived by party or as other-
wise provided by law); IND. §63-3008; Wis. §227.07.
"ALAS. §44,62.310(d) (1).
100 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 353 (1965).
ARK, §5-702(c) (2); FLA. §120,23; IDAHO §67-5202; LA. §49:953(2); MINN. §15.0412;
NED. §84-909; NE.v, §233B.050; OKLA, tit. 75, §302; ORE. §183.330; R.I. §42-352; S,
D. §1-26-2(2); V. tit. 3, §802(c) (2); WASH. §34.04.090; W. VA. §29A-5 1(b); WIS.
§227.08; WYO. §9-276.20.
102ARK. §5-709(c) (authority granted to presiding officer only); FLA. §120.25; W. Va.
§29A-5-1 (d).
1 ALAS. §44.62.450; CAL, GoV'i CODE § 11512; Ehrlich v. McConnell, 166 Cal. App.2d 129,
333 P.2d 171 (1969) (order of procedure during hearing is subject to discretion of hearing
officer); Feist v. Rowe, 3 Cal. App.3d 404, 83 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1970) (order of proof is
within discretion of hearing officer).
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A few acts simply state that the agency, the presiding officer,
or the hearing officer shall regulate the course of the hearing, with-
out granting authority to adopt specific rules of procedure."'
The New Mexico statute is unique in its treatment of the hearing
procedure. It provides that rules of practice and procedure which
are applicable to civil actions in the state district courts may be
utilized by the parties at any stage during the proceedings. If the
agency declines to enforce any such rule, it will be enforced by the
district court with jurisdiction upon application to that court for
an order requesting such procedure.' 5 The purpose of this provision
would seem to be to allow for informal proceedings if the parties
should so desire, while preserving the right to have the more strin-
gent rules of a civil court applied.
Burden of Proof
Only two jurisdictions specifically provide for allocating the
burden of proof in an administrative proceeding.0 Both of these
place the burden on the proponent of the rule or order. Cooper at-
tributes the absence of a statutory provision in this area to the
universal use, by the state courts, of the common law rule which
requires the moving party to sustain the burden of proof, includ-
ing not only the burden of going forward with the evidence, but
also the burden of ultimate persuasion.10 7 Thus, where the proceed-
ing is disciplinary in nature, the burden of proof is on the agency ;1
whereas when a party seeks to obtain a license, take an examina-
tion, or claim a right, the burden of proof is on him to establish
his right to do so.109 However, application of the above principles
does not always yield the expected result as is illustrated by com-
paring similar cases from different jurisdictions. In Reinke v. Per-
sonnel Bd.,110 the appellant, a youth counselor at a state school for
girls, was dismissed from her position by the board. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that in a discharge proceeding the ap-
pointing authority had the burden of proving that the discharge
was for cause, and that the Personnel Board had erred in placing
the burden on the appellant. In Smith v. School Dist. of Darby,"'
1t4 INn. §63-3007 (agency regulates hearing); MICH. §24.280 (presiding officer regulates);
MONT. §82-4211 (agency members or hearing officer regulates).
sN.M. §4-32-11 I.
1t6AR. §5.709 (d); D.C. § 1-1509 (b).
157] F. COOPER, STATE ADMLISTRATIVE LAW 355 (1965).
'Cornell v. Reilly, 127 Cal. App.2d 178, 273 P.2d 572 (1954); Reinke v. Personnel Bd.,
33 Wis.2d 123, 191 N.W.2d 33 (1971).
'19 Lay v. State Bd. of Osteopadic Examiners, 179 Cal. App.2d 356, 3 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1960).
11033 Wis,2d 123, 191 N.W.2d 33 (1971).
"1 388 Pa. 301, 130 A.2d 661 (1957).
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however, appellant was demoted from his position of supervising
school principal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
burden was on the appellant to prove that the action of the school
board was arbitrary and therefore improper. Thus it can be seen
that fine distinctions are drawn in allocating the burden of proof,
perhaps indicating a need for more states to enact a statutory pro-
vision in this area.
Rules of Evidence
Most states have adopted provisions the same, or substantially
the same as those of the RMSAPA regarding rules of evidence.1
They are:
In contested cases irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repeti-
tious evidence shall be excluded. The rules of evidence as
applied in [non-jury] civil cases in the [district courts
of this state] shall be followed. When necessary to ascertain
facts not reasonably susceptible of proof under those rules,
evidence not admissible thereunder may be admitted (ex-
cept where precluded by statute) if it is of a type commonly
relied on by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their
affairs. Agencies shall give effect to the rules of privilege
recognized by law. Objections to evidentiary offers may be
made and shall be noted in the record. Subject to these re-
quirements, when a hearing will be expedited and the inter-
ests of the parties will not be prejudiced substantially, any
part of the evidence may be received in written form. 13
It is obvious that these evidentiary rules are less stringent than
those employed in the courts, because of the clause permitting the
introduction of evidence not ordinarily admissible if it is of a type
commonly relied on by reasonably prudent men. Cooper indicates
that the model statute is a compromise between two opposite
views. 114 One view holds that the rules should be even more lenient,
allowing the introduction of any evidence a reasonable man would
rely on; the other holds that, in the interest of simplification and
uniformity, agencies should follow the same rules as courts do in
civil cases. The former position originated during an earlier period
when administrative agencies were composed of people without
a great deal of expertise in the law who conducted hearings in
112ARK. §5-709(d); IDAHO §67-5210(1); LA. §49:956; ME. §2405; MiCH. §24.275; Mmaq.
§15.0419 subd. 1, NEv. §233B.123; NM. §4-32-11A; OKLA. §310(1); R.I. §4 2-35-10(c);
S.D. §1-26-19(1); VT. tit. 3, §801(1); WAS. §34.04.100(1); W. VA. §29A-5-2;
WYO. §9-276.26 (a).
113 RMSAPA (1970).
114 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 384 (1965).
197S]
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
which the parties were rarely represented by counsel.1 It was
therefore deemed unnecessary to hold the agencies to technical rules
of evidence. However, as administrative practice exists today, with
many states providing for legally trained hearing examiners, and
all of them granting a party the right to counsel, there seems to be
little justification for not applying the same rules of evidence as
are used in the trial of civil cases.
One state does provide that, although the normal standard
for admissibility is evidence of a type commonly accepted by rea-
sonable prudent men in the conduct of their affairs, a party may
request that the agency be bound by the rules of evidence applicable
in the state district courts. The request must be made in writing to
the agency.116
Two states specifically permit the admission of hearsay evi-
dence to explain or supplant other evidence, but admonish that it
is insufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be ad-
missible in a civil proceeding.' Two other states simply provide
that agencies are not required to follow technical rules of evi-
dence, and that substantial, reliable, and probative evidence should
be admitted.13 Another two states mandate that an offer of proof
to which an objection has been sustained will be placed in the
record. 1 9 Montana is the only state which requires that the common
law and statutory rules of evidence be followed without excep-
tion." Statutes of other jurisdictions are not readily susceptible of
categorization.'
Cross-Examination
The right of cross-examination is fundamental to a fair hear-
ing. Heeding this maxim, the majority of states afford this impor-
tant right to parties to a contested case. The right is qualified in
many statutes, however, which grant only the ". . . right to conduct
such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true
1111d. 379, 380.
16 NEB. §84-914.
i7 ALAS. §44.62.470; CAL. GOVT. CODE §11513(c),
1' ARi, §41-1010; IND. §63-3008.
119 Mo. § 536-070; OH4IO § 119.09.
120 MONT. §82A2 10.
1z' D.C. §1-1509 (b) (any oral or documentary evidence acceptable; irrelevant, immaterial and
unduly repetitious evidence to be excluded) ; MASS. § 11 (z) (need not observe rules of evi-
dence; standard for admissibility is evidence on which reasonable men rely in the conduct
of their affairs); ORE. § 183.450 (same rules as applied in equity cases; erroneous admission
of evidence does not preclude action on the record unless prejudice is shown); Wis.
§227.10(1) (admit all testimony having reasonably probative value); FLA. §120.26 (pro-
bative effect given to evidence admissible in civil proceedings but exclusionary rules of
evidence are not to be used to prevent receipt of evidence having substantial probative
effect).
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disclosure of the facts"2 (emphasis added). The reason for the
qualification is to provide for the situation in which cross-examina-
tion is impractical (e.g., where the evidence is a written report
authored by several agency employees), and rebuttal facts are readily
obtainable from other sources.2 Other states do not qualify the right
in this manner, and additionally provide that a party has the right to
submit rebuttal evidence. '24 Others merely say that each party has
the right of cross-examination.125
Establishment of Record
It is desirable that there be a complete record of the hearing in
order that the decision of the administrative agency be a completely
informed one and to provide a basis for judicial review. To accom-
plish this, the RMSAPA and those states 2 6 which have based their
administrative procedure acts thereon require the inclusion of the
following specific items in the record.
The pleadings, motions, and intermediate rulings must be
included in the record. This facilitates crystallization of the issues
and compels a decision to be rendered on each point of contention.
All evidence received, or considered, must be included to insure
that the agency's decision is based solely on the evidence presented
and to allow the reviewing court to consider any evidentiary
material which the agency might have rejected, thus protecting a
party from an adverse decision which is unsupported by evidence
in the record, and affording him the opportunity to have a court
examine all offers of proof, whether they have been accepted or
rejected by the agency.
Official notice in an administrative hearing is the analog of
judicial notice in a judicial proceeding. A statement of matters of-
ficially noticed is to be made in the record. This informs the parties
and the reviewing court as to what assumptions, if any, the agency
has relied on in reaching its decision and allows them to rebut any
which may be unfounded.
'
22ALAS. §5-709(c); COLO. §3-16-4; D.C. §1-1509(b); FLA. §120-26(z); IDAHO
§67-5210(3); LA. §49:955; OKLA. §310(3); R.I. §4 2.35-I0(c); S.D. §1-26-10(z);
VT. tit 3, §810(3); WASH. §31.04.100(3); WYo. §9-276.26.
i1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 373 et seq. (1965).
124MAss. §11(3); MICH. §24.272(4); MIN. §15.0419 subd. 3; NEB. §84-914(4); N.M.
§4 -32-11 (c); ORE. §183.450(3); W. VA. §29A.5-2(c).
121Aiz. §41-1010; IND. §63-3008; Mo. §536.070.
'
26ARIZ. §41-1009; ARK. §5-708 (e); IDAHO §6 7-5209(e); MicH. §24.286; MONT §82-4709;
NEv. §233B.121(5)(b); N.M. §4.32-10D; OKLA. §309(e); ORE. §183.415; R.I.§42-35-91(e); S.D. §1-26-22; VT. tit. 3, §809(e); WASH. §34.04.090(4); WYO.
§9-276.25 (m), (n).
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Offers of proof, objections, and rulings thereon are included
in the record to insure its completeness and to disclose to the re-
viewing court specific evidentiary points upon which the parties
and the agency differ.
Proposed findings and exceptions thereto, as well as the report
of the hearing officer are also encompassed in the record. Their
purpose is to indicate to the parties the reasoning of the agency in
arriving at its decision and the basis for such decision. Access to
this information will also reveal to a party differences, should there
be any, in the rationale relied upon by the hearing officer compared
to that used by the agency.
Finally, staff memoranda are to be included so that no pertinent
information, upon which the agency may have predicated its find-
ings, can be withheld from a party; both he and the reviewing
court will have access to all facts and opinions from which the final
order could have been drawn."'
Enforcement of Agency Decision
Once the administrative agency has reached a decision by way
of an administrative adjudication, the power of the agency to enforce
its decision becomes critically important to both the agency and
any party potentially affected by such decision.
Interestingly, of those jurisdictions with administrative pro-
cedurc acts, only five have a provision for enforcement of an admin-
istrative agency's decision.12 Further, although there are numerically
five different enforcement provisions, in substance there are basically
only two varieties.
Three states"' provide that if a person refuses to obey or dis-
obeys any lawful order of an administrative agency, such agency
can petition a court of law"3 for a court order directing such
person to appear before the court to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt. Substantially in accordance with the
foregoing provision is the Arkansas provision"1 which states that
an agency can apply to the court13' for a hearing wherein a court
order may be granted, in the court's discretion, directing compli-
ance with the agency's decision; failure to comply with such court
order is punishable as contempt.
127 For, a more detailed discussion of the reasons for the above requirements, see I F. COOPER,
STATE ADMNISTRATiE LAw 421-43 (1965).
"$ALAS. §44.62.590; ARK. §5-709; CAL. Gov'r, CODE § 11525; IND. §63-3027; Mo. §536.095.
129 ALAS. §44.62.590; CAL GOV'T. CODE §11525; Mo. §536.095.
'" Alaska, superior court; California, superior court; Missouri, circuit court.
1"1 ARK. §5-709.
12 ARK. §5-709, circuit court.
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The remaining state which has an agency enforcement pro-
vision in its administrative procedure act, Indiana, 33 provides that
an agency can bring an action in equity to compel compliance with
the agency's decision.
Noteworthy is the fact that although there may be no express
provision in an administrative procedure act authorizing an agency
to enforce its own adjudicatory decision, the administrative agency
is not necessarily rendered powerless since other statutes ordinarily
authorize judicial enforcement of an agency's adjudicatory deci-
sion."' Further, contempt proceedings may lie to punish one who
does not comply with such judicial order or decree of enforcement 3
Stay Pending Appeal
State administrative procedure legislation, involving the power
of courts to stay administrative agency action pending review in
the courts, is considerably diverse. A number of the state statutes
provide for a stay of administrative agency action at the discretion
of either the reviewing court or the administrative agency.' In
effect, such statutory provisions substantially adopt the language
of the RMSAPA which states: "The agency may grant, or the re-
viewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms." 137
While Alaska is included among those states providing for a
stay at the discretion of either the administrative agency or the
reviewing court,'38 such discretion may be exercised only under
certain circumstances. Specifically, as set out in the case of Alaska
Coastal Airlines v. S & M Flight Training,39 a stay may be
granted only under the following conditions: (a) when petitioner
is likely to prevail on the merits of the appeal; (b) where the
petitioner has shown that without a stay he will suffer irreparable
injury; (c) where there is no substantial harm to other interested
persons; and, (d) where the public interest will not be harmed.
While most of the statutory provisions authorize a stay at
the discretion of either the administrative agency or the reviewing
33 IND. §63-3027.
134 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law §509 (1962).
1332 AM. JUR. 25 Administrative Law §517 (1962),
136 A LAS. §§44.62.520, 44.62.570; ARK. §5-713; CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §1094.5; CAL. GoV'r.
CODE §11519; COLO. §3-16-5; D.C. §1-1510; FLA. §120.31; GA. §3A-120; HAWAII
§91-14; LA. §49:964; MASs. ch. 30A §14; MINN. §15.0424; Mo. §536.120; MONT.
§82-4216; Nsa. §84-917; NEV. §233B.140; N.M. §4-32-18; OKLA. tit. 75, §319; ORE.
§183.480; R.I. §42-35-15; VT. tit, 3, §815; WASH. §34.04.130; W. VA. §29A-5-4.
137 RMSAPA §15 (c) (1961).
13 ALAs. §§44.62.520, 44.62.560.
139 6 ALAS.L.J. No. 4, 103 (April, 1968) (unreported superior court decision).
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court, generally the same administrative procedure acts additionally
provide that a petition or appeal for judicial review does not auto-
matically operate to stay administrative agency action.14 0
Diametrically opposed to those state statutes which provide
that a petition or appeal for judicial review does not automatically
stay administrative agency action are the administrative procedure
acts of South Dakota and Virginia which provide for an automatic
stay following the agency's adjudicatory decision. 141
In a manner similar to the administrative procedure legisla-
tion of South Dakota and Virginia, three states provide that in
specific cases or under certain circumstances a stay shall auto-
matically issue.1 42 While the administrative procedure legislation of
Colorado, Florida, and Oklahoma basically provides that a stay is
discretionary in either the administrative agency or the reviewing
court,143 such state administrative procedure statutes also specifically
provide that a stay shall automatically issue if (a) irreparable
injury would otherwise result;' (b) the administrative agency
order has the effect of suspending or revoking a license ;145 or, (c)
enforcement of the administrative agency order would result in
irreparable impairment of constitutional rights."'
Several state administrative procedure acts authorize the issu-
ance of stays only at the discretion of the reviewing court. 147 While
in this situation the agency has no express power to stay its own
decision, presumably, such power would be implied.40
10 ALAS. §§44.62.520, 44.62.570; ARK. §5-173; CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE §1094.5; CAL. Gov'T.
CODE §11519; COLO. §3-16-5; D.C. §1-1510; FLA. §120.31; GA. §3A-120; HAWAII §91-14;
LA. §49:964; MASS. Ch. 30A §14; MINN. §15.0424; Mo. §536.120; MONT. §82-4216;
NEB. §84-917; NEV. §233B.140; N.M. §4-32-18; OKLA. tit. 75, §319; ORE. §183.480;
RI. §42-35-15; VT. tit. 3, §815; WASH. §34.04.130; W. VA. §29A-5-4.
141 S.D. §21-33-10, where upon appeal A stay is automatically granted for a 10-day period with
any further extension of the stay within the discretion of the court; VA.§9-6.13, where
upon appeal a stay is automatically granted unless it appears to the court that immediate
enforcement of the order is essential to the public health or safety.
142CoLo. §3-16-5; FLA. §120.31; OKLA. tit. 75. §319.
'"ALAS. §§44.62.520, 44.62.570; ARK. §5-713; CAL. CIr. PRO. CODE §1094.5; CAL. GOV'T.
CODE §11519; COLO, §3-16-5; D.C. §1-1510; FLA. §120.31; GA. §3A-120; HAWAtI §91-14;
LA. §49:964, MASS. ch. 30A §14; MIrNN. §15.0424; Mo. §536.120; MONT. §82-4216;
NaB, §84-917; NEV. §233B.140; N.M. §4-32-18; OKLA, tit. 75, §319; Oto. §183.480;
RI. §42-35.15; VT. tit. 3, §815; WASH. §34.04.130; W. VA. §29A-5-4.
'4 COLO. §3-16- 5.
145 FLA. §120.31.
146 0KLA. tit. 75, §319,
147ARIZ §12-931; ILL. ch. 110, §275; IND. §63-3017; Ma. tit. 5, §2451; ND. §28-32.20;
OHIO §119.12; PA. tit. 71, §1710.43; VA, §9-6-13; Wis. §227.17. Note also that a stay
will not be issued in Ohio unless it appears to the court that an unusual hardship would
otherwise result.
1432 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 627 (1965).
(Vol. 22:281
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol22/iss2/7
SURVEY - STATES' A.P.A.'s
Included in the category of state administrative procedure acts
which expressly provide for the issuance of a stay is the Indiana
act. 14 Noteworthy though, is the fact that the Indiana statute
authorizes the reviewing court to use its discretion only if such
court finds that the petition for stay shows a reasonable probability
that the administrative agency order or determination appealed
from is invalid or illegal.50
Finally, of the 41 state administrative procedure acts con-
sidered, a significant number of such acts contain no provision
whatsoever for a stay of the administrative agency action pending
review in the courts; 151 consequently, there can be no stay of ad-
ministrative agency action pursuant to the administrative procedure
acts of such states.
Standing to Obtain Judicial Review
Although most of the administrative procedure statutes pro-
vide for some form of judicial relief from administrative action,
one of the limitations on the availability of such relief is the re-
quirement of legal standing.5 2 Involved in the concept of standing
to sue, a widely recognized but often troublesome doctrine,"' are
the issues of justiciability,"4 legal injury or interest,1 5 finality of
the administrative decision,"' and exhaustion of extra-judicial
remedies.'57 The question of justiciability is dealt with in the ad-
ministrative procedure acts on the basis of the legal wrong
suffered."5 Generally, the person seeking review of a rule making
decision must allege that his legal rights or privileges have been
impaired or threatened.15 9 In seeking judicial review of an adjudi-
149 IND. §63-3017.
150 Id,
151 Nine of the jurisdictions considered have administrative procedure statutes with no express
provision for a stay pending court review: Conn., Idaho, Iowa, Kan., Ky., Md., Mich., N.J.,
Wyo.
"
t Rouveyral v. Donnelly, 365 Mo. 686, 285 S.W.2d 699 (1956); Baltimore Retail Liquor
Package Stores Assoc. v. Kerngood, 171 Md. 426, 189 A 209 (1937).
'
0 See, e.g., Elast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
"' Basiliko v. Government of the District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 816 (D.C. 1971); School
Comm'n. v. Superintendent of Schools, 320 Mass. 516, 70 N.E.2d 298 (1946); Sherwin v.
Mackie, 364 Mich. 188, 111 N.W.2d 56 (1961).
1S'McCarrell v. Lane, 76 Ariz. 67, 258 P.2d 988 (1953); Junior College Dist. of Sedalia v.
Barker, 418 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1967).
"
6 Arizona Comm'n. of Agric. & Hortie. v. Jones, 91 Ariz. 183, 370 P.26 665 (1962); Powell
v. Board of Rule Instr. of Levy County, 229 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1969).
... Bank of Wheeling v, Morris Plan Bank & Trust Co., 183 S.E.2d 692 (W.Va. 1971).
I" Portwood v. Falls City Brew. Co., 318 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1958).
159D.C. §1-1510; GA. §3A-111; IDAHo §67-5207; MD. Art. 41, §245; MINN. §15.0416;
MONT. §82-4219; NEn, §84-911; NEV. §233B.110; OKLA. tit. 75, §306; R.I. §42-35-7;
S.D. §1.26-14; VT. tit. 3, §807; WASH. §34.04.070; W. VA. §29A-4-2; Wis. §227.05.
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cated or contested case, however, one need only show that he is
"aggrieved"1 60 or "adversely affected.101
The distinctions drawn between appeals from rule making
orders and appeals from adjudicated decisions rest on the separa-
tion of functions within the administrative agency itself. The pro-
cedures dictated by most of the statutes"62 recognize the quasi-
legislative nature of rule making as opposed to the quasi-judicial
function of applying those rules to individual contestants.1 63 Thus,
it has been held that the statutory procedure providing for de-
claratory judgment as to the validity of an administrative rule is
not the proper vehicle to obtain judicial review of a contested case
where the administrative decision affects only the parties to the
proceeding.'"
The exclusiveness of the statutory review provisions permitting
recourse to the courts has been variously construed. Courts have
demonstrated reluctance to interfere with the administrative
process by inferring an exclusive and primary jurisdiction in the
administrative agency by virtue of legislative grant,1 65 by finding
that judicial review provisions are a matter of legislative grace
rather than right,' and by refusing original jurisdiction even
where the question of damages is involved.167 Where the act does
not provide otherwise, at least one court has found the statutory
scheme to be the exclusive method of obtaining judicial review.'
Others have held the applicable provisions to be permissive only
16
and, if not irreconcilable with other statutes providing for recourse
to the judiciary, merely an alternative method of review.170
160 D.C. §1-1510; GA. §3A-120 (a); HAWAII §91-14(a); IDAHO §67-5215 (a); INn. §63-3014;
LA. §49:964; ME. tit. 5, §2451; MAss. ch. 30A, §14; MICH. §24.301; MINN. §15.0424;
MO. §536.100; MoNT. §82-4216; NEB. 84.917(1); OHIO §119.12; OKLA. tit. 75, §318(1);
ORE. §183.480(1); PA. tit. 71, §1710.41; RI. §42-35-15(a); S.D. §1-26-30; Vr. tit. 3,
815; WASH. §34.04.130 (1); Wis. §227.16; WYO. §9-276.32,
'D.C. §1-1510; N.M. §4-32-16c; OKLA. tit. 75, §318(1); ORE. §183.480(1); W. VA.
§29A-5-4 (a).
l2Bat see, IOWA §17A.11; KAN. §77-434; Wyo. §9-276.32 (requirements identical for both
rule making and adjudicato proceedings).
13 Board of Liquor License Comm'rs. v. Leone, 249 Md. 263, 239 A.2d 82 (1968); Former v.
Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970) (procedure under OHIo §119.11 per-
mitting appeals from rules in their final form cannot be utilized to obtain review of quasi-
legislative proceedings).
16
'Meikle John v. American Distrib. Inc., 210 So.2d 259 (Fla. App. 1968) (citing FLA.
§120.30, the section permitting declaratory judgment as to the validity of any agency rule).
16 Antoine v. Fletcher, 307 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. App. 1957).
166 Allen v. Graham, 8 Ariz. App. 336, 446 P.2d 240 (1968).
'
6 7 Bank of Wheeling v. Morris Plan Bank & Trust Co., 183 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1971).
1 New Eng. Tel. & T. Co. v. Fascio, 105 R.I. 711, 254 A.2d 758 (1969).
'Allied Theatres of New Eng., Inc. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 338 Mass. 609, 156
N.E.2d 424 (1959).
17°Zigmond v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 186 S.F.2d 696 (W. Va. 1972).
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As noted above, most of the administrative procedure acts in
effect separate the procedures for judicial review of rule making
orders from the procedures to be followed after a decision has been
rendered in an adjudicated case. The requirements of standing
differ principally in accordance with this statutory design and will
be considered separately.
Rule Making
The rule making provision most commonly found in state admin-
istrative procedure acts incorporates the concept of legal wrong."'
It requires that the person seeking judicial review of an agency rule
making order must allege that the rule in its final form or in its
application impairs or interferes with or threatens to impair or
interfere with the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff.7 Failure
to allege such interference or threatened injury has been held to deny
the plaintiff the standing necessary to contest the agency rule under
attack.173 A few statutes broaden the requirement somewhat by per-
mitting judicial review if the rule or its application interferes with
or threatens to interfere with the right, privileges, or interests of
the complaining party.'
Where more specific language is found, a few statutes require
the person seeking judicial review to be an "interested person, 175
a "person affected,"1" or a "person adversely affected." 7' A Cali-
fornia court has construed an "interested person" to be one with a
direct and not merely a consequential interest in the litigation."7
Once qualified, an "interested person" has the consequent right to
obtain judicial declaration of the validity of any agency rule or
standard of general application. 79
A person "adversely affected," one with legal standing to attack
an agency rule, has been held to be one amenable to and controlled
by the specific rule who objects to it as placing him in an unfavor-
able position relative to that which he enjoyed prior to the imple-
17 Portwood v. Falls City Brew. Co., 518 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1958).
17D.C. §1-1510; GA. §3A-111; IDAHO §67-5207; MD. Art. 41 §245; MINN. §15.0416;
MONT. §82-4219; NEB. §84-911; Nav. §233B.110; OKLA. tit. 75, §306; R.I. 42-35-7;
S.D. §1-26-14; VT. tit. 3, §807; WAsH. §34.04.070; W. VA. §29A-4-2; Wis. §227.05.
7 Basiliko v. Government of District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 816 (D.C. App. 1971).
"AR K. §5-705; KAN. §77-434; N.M. §4-32-8(A); ORB. §183.400.
"' ALAS. §44.62.300; CAL. Gov'i. CODE §11440; HAwAII §91-7(b); W. VA. §29A 4-2.
"'ARIZ. §44-1007; FLA. §120.30(1).
77Osno §119.11.
'Associated Boat Indus. of No. Cal. v. Marshall, 104 Cal.App.2d 21, 230 P.2d 379 (1951).
179Bess v. Park, 132 Cal.App.2d 49, 281 P.2d 556 (1955); see generally, Hutchinson, Judicial
Review of Administrative Rule Making, 15 HAST.L.J. 272 (1964).
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mentation of the new rule.'80 Alternatively, one is "adversely affected"
within the meaning of the statute if enforcement of the rule would
result in gross injustice.'
Although rule making provisions requiring the finality of the
administrative order promulgating the new rule and the doctrine
of exhaustion of all administrative remedies are more prevalent in
the adjudicatory sections,2 it has been held that the necessity for
a final agency order is implicit before judicial review of rule mak-
ing is available. 8 3 Several courts, while generally adhering to the
concept of exhaustion of all remedies provided within the agency
framework as a condition precedent to judicial review, 14 do not
demand strict observance of the doctrine when to do so would
result in a useless effort ' or when no adequate remedy is available
thereby.1 '8 As a corollary to this doctrine, only a few of the statutes
require that the plaintiff request a declaratory ruling from the par-
ticular agency first as a condition to the right to seek judicial
review. 7 In Maine alone, the contestant must first seek and obtain
a declaratory ruling from a specially appointed hearing commission.'$
Adjudicatory
The greater portion of the current administrative procedure
statutes confers legal standing to obtain judicial review of an ad-
judicated case upon any "person aggrieved" by the agency's order
or decision.1 9 A person has been held to be "aggrieved" when an
order adversely affects in some substantial manner some personal
or property right of the plaintiff.'0 The aggrievement is most likely
180 Columbus Green Cabs, Inc. v. Board of Rev., 88 Ohio L.Abs. 107, 184 N.E.2d 257 (1961).
"I Mastroianni v. Board of Liq. Control, 98 Ohio App. 500, 130 N.B.2d 380 (1954).
"'GA. §3A-120(a); MICH. §24.301; Mo. §536.100; MONT. §82-4216; R.I. §42-35-15 (a);
S.D. §1-26-30; VT. tit. 3, §815; WYo. §9-276.32.
183 Powell v. Board of Pub. Instr. of Levy County, 229 So.2d 308 (Fla. App. 1969).
184 Parshay v. Buchoe, 30 Mich.App. 556, 186 N.W.2d 859 (1971).
185 Welfare Emp. Union v. Michigan Civ. Serv. Comm'n., 28 Mich.App. 343, 184 N.W.2d 247
(1970).
186 Schwall v, Dearborn, 31 Mich.App. 169, 187 N.W.2d 543 (1971).
187 D.C. §1-1508; KAN. §77-434; LA. §49:963; MICH. §24.264.
8 ME. tit. 5, §2402.
189D.C. §1-1510; GA. §3A-120(a); HAwAII §91-14(a); IDAHO §67-5215(a); IND. §63-
3014; LA. §49:964; ME. tit. 5, §2451; MASS. ch. 30A, §14; MICH. §24.301; MINN.
§15.0424; Mo. §536.100; MONT. §82-4216; Nsa. §84.917(1); OHIO §119.12 OKLA. it.
75, §318(1); ORE. §183.480(1); PA. tit. 71, §1710.41; R.I. §42-35-15(a); S.D. §1-26-30;
VT. tit. 3, §815; WASH. §34.04.130(1); Wis. §227.16; Wyo. §9-276.32.
101n re Getsug, 290 Minn. 110, 186 N.W.2d 686 (1971); Buffi v. Ferri, 259 A.2d 847 (R.I.
1969).
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to occur where two or more persons seek mutually exclusive priv-
ileges, as in the case of licenses, where the party denied the re-
quested privilege is directly affected by the agency's decision.'91
The agency itself has been held not to fall within the statutory
meaning of "aggrieved" where it seeks to appeal the order of the
reviewing court. 192 If, however, the public has an interest in the
issue which extends beyond the immediate interests of the parties
involved, the agency has been found to have standing sufficient to
appeal an adverse order of the reviewing court even though not
technically an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of the statute.9
A few of the statutes specifically require that the person seek-
ing judicial relief must have been a party to the original proceed-
ings before the administrative agency rendering the decision.194
Still others confer legal standing upon those "adversely affected"
by an agency's decision.95 Often, the "adversely affected" category of
permissible plaintiffs is an alternative to that of those "aggrieved. 196
A person or party "affected" has been construed to be one who
has appeared before the agency during the proceedings prior to
decision or one given legal notice of such proceedings. 97
The finality of the order or decision rendered by the agency in
an adjudicated case is a common prerequisite to obtaining judicial
redress in many of the statutes.1" A final decision in a contested
case has been statutorily defined as "one which has become a de-
cision of the agency either by express approval or by the failure
of an aggrieved person to file exceptions thereto within a prescribed
time under the agency's rules." '199 The decision itself must be an
agency determination which serves to terminate the proceedings im-
mediately before it.2"'
B1 Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n., Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n., 342 Mass.
694, 175 N.F.2d 244 (1961).
192 Minnesota Water Res. Bd. v. Traverse County, 287 Minn. 130, 77 N.W.2d 44 (1970),
193 Buffh v. Ferri, 259 A.2d 847 (R.I. 1969).
19 4 FLA. §120.31;Mc. Art. 41, §255; W. VA. §29A-5-4(a).
1 91D.C. §1-1510; N.M. §4-32-16c; OKLA. tit. 75, §318(1); ORE. §183.480(1); W. VA.
§29A-5-4(a),
"D.C. §1-1510; OKLA. tit. 75, §318(1); ORE. §183.480(1).
' Roer v. Superior Ct. In and For Coconino County, 4 Ariz. App. 46, 417 P.2d 559 (1966).
'"ALAs. §44.62.560; ARK. §5-713(a); CAL. GOV'T. CODE §11523; HAwAii §91-14(a);
IDAHO §67-5215(a); LA. §49:964; ME. tit. 5 §2451; MD. Art. 41, §255; MASS. ch. 30A,
§14; MICH. §24.301; MINN. §15.0424; Mo. §536.100; MONT. §82-4216; NEB. §84-
917(1); NEV. §233B.130; N.J. §52:14B-12; N.D. §28-32-15; OKLA. tit. 75, §318(1);
ORE. §183.480(1); R.I. §42-35-15(a); VT. it. 3, §815; WASH. §34.04.130; W. VA.
§29A-5-4(a); Wis. §227.16; WYO. §9-276.32.
119 MINN. §15.0424.
20 0Arisona Comm. of Agric. & Hort. v. Jones, 91 Ariz. 183, 370 P.2d 665 (1962).
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In spite of the general statutory agreement that a decision to
be reviewable must be final, a few of the acts qualify this condition
by permitting immediate review of a preliminary procedural or
intermediate agency action or ruling if waiting until the final de-
cision would not provide an adequate remedy.01
The exhaustion of all remedies available within the agency
framework as a prerequisite to obtaining judicial review of any
agency decision or ruling is expressly provided for in a number of
statutes."2 Even where the courts lack such express statutory con-
ditions, it has been held that, as a general rule, all available agency
remedies must be explored prior to seeking relief in the courts.203
This is so unless the agency lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
the proceedings in which the decision was made2 4 or if the admin-
istrative remedy was unavailable or inadequate.
2 5
Legal standing to obtain judicial review of administrative rules,
orders, and decisions under the administrative procedure acts is
intimately tied to specific statutory conditions. Even where it can
be established that the plaintiff is an "aggrieved person" or an
"interested person" within the particular statutory context, the re-
quirement of finality of the contested decision and the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies often serve to prohibit or
delay access to the judiciary.
Scope of Judicial Review
The majority of jurisdictions surveyed specifically provide that
judicial review of administrative action may only determine whether
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced by the
agency during its procedures and/or in the issuance of its order,
decision, or findings."' Two states, Connecticut and Kentucky, list
no specific statutory authority for judicial review of administrative
action. In Vermont, review of administrative action may be had as
in the case of any county court decision.20 7 Iowa, while having no
201 GA. §3A-120(a); MICH. §24.301; R.I. §42-35-15 (a); S.D. §1-26-30.
202GA. §3A-120(a); MICH. §24.301; Mo. §536.100; MONT. §82-4216; R.I. §42-35-15 (a);
S.D. §1-26-30; VT. tit. 3, §815; WYO. §9-276.32.
OD Bank of Wheeling v. Morris Plan Bank & Trust Co., 183 S.E.2d 692 (W.Va. 1971).
24 Los Angeles County v. Department of Soc. Wel., 41 Cal.2d 455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953).
20 5 Martino v. Concord Comm. Hosp. Dist., 233 Cal. App.2d 57, 43 Cal. Rptr. 255, (1965).
116 ALAS. §44.62.570; ARIZ. §12-911; ARK. §5-713 (h); CAL. CIV. PRO. ConE §1094.5; COLO.
§3-16; D.C. §1-1510; FLA. §120.31(2); GA. §3A-120(h); HAwAn §91.14(g); IDAHO
§67-5215(g); ILL. §110-275; Itn. §68-3018; KAN. §77-434; IA. §49-964; ME. tit. 5,
§2451; MD. Art. 41, §255; MASS. ch. 30A, §14(8); MICH. §24.306; MINN. §15.0425;
Mo. §536.140; MONT. §82-4216; NEB. §84-917(6); NEV. §23313.140(5); N.J.
§52:14B9; N.M. §4.32-22; N-D §28-32-19; OHIO §119.12; OKLA. tit. 75, §322; ORE.
§183.480(7); PA. tit. 71, §1710.41; R.I. §42-35-15(g); S.D. §1-26-36; VA, §9-6.13;
WASH. §34.04.130(6); WVA, §29A-5-4(g); Wis. §227.20(1); Wyo. §9-276.3 2 (c),
207 VT. RULES OF PROCEDURE 74(e).
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specific statutory provision for judicial review of agency action,
does provide in its common law for a trial de novo in the trial
court or in an appeals court when such action is being reviewed.
20
'
The substantive rights which the court is allowed to examine
upon review are substantially similar in all jurisdictions:
1. Did the administrative agency proceed in excess of its
statutory authority or jurisdiction; did it proceed in an
unlawful manner?
2. Did the administrative agency in its proceedings violate
procedural due process?
3. Did the administrative agency come to its decision on a
sound evidentiary basis as provided by that particular
state's administrative procedure act as interpreted by
common law?
4. Was the decision of the administrative agency arbitrary,
capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion?
There is, of course, some overlap among these four classifications.
If an action violates constitutional due process, it is also unlawful
and without the jurisdiction of the administrative agency taking
such action. If an administrative action is arbitrary or capricious,
it may violate procedural due process. Therefore each of these
categories must not be looked upon as existing in isolation, but all
must be considered together by the reviewing court.
Because a state administrative agency is granted its authority
by state statute, any action taken by such an agency which is in
excess of its enabling statute is void, and the same result obtains
if the administrative agency exceeds its constitutional authority,
state or federal.209 In every state which is allowed to review such
agency decisions the reviewing court may reverse, set aside, or
vacate the rule, decision, or action taken by the administrative
agency.' The Wyoming Supreme Court has twice specifically looked
at the jurisdiction of the administrative agency involved when
deciding recent cases. In Neel v. City oj Laramie,"' the City Council
2" Buda v. Fulton, 261 Iowa 981, 157 N.W.2d 336 (1968).
2" State ex rel. Standard Oil Co. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 230 Ind.
1, 101 N.E.2d 60 (1951).
2 5 Jurisdictions in which the reviewing court may reverse the administrative agency specifi-
cally by statute: Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho, Ill., La., Me., Md., Mich.,
Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.M., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., R.I., S.D., Va., Wash.,
W. Va., Wis. Jurisdictions in which the reviewing court may set aside the administrative
agency decision specifically by statute: Alas., Cal., Colo., D.C., Ind., Okla., Mass., Mich.,
N.M., Pa. Jurisdictions in which the reviewing court may vacate the administrative agency
decision specifically by statute: Kan., Ohio, W. Va.
211 4 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1971).
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of Laramie, Wyoming was originally enjoined from building a
bridge across from plaintiff's property, but the injunction was later
dissolved by the lower court because the administrative agency had
complied with all statutory procedures. The Wyoming Supreme
Court affirmed, partly because the plaintiff had not shown that the
agency in its action was in excess of the statutory authority which
allowed it to build such bridges. In so holding, the court relied on
the Wyoming administrative procedure act.' In King v. White,"
another Wyoming decision, the appellee was the assignee of a lease
of real property. The Land Board denied appellant payment for
water rights which the agency took on the property in question.
The lower court reversed the Land Board, but the Wyoming Supreme
Court reversed the lower court, affirming the Board's decision. In
citing the Wyoming administrative procedure act"4 the court held
in part that the Land Board had been acting within its statutory
jurisdiction in denying the appellee payment.
Prior to the passage of state administrative procedure acts it
was held that the courts had a limited right to ascertain whether
the requirements of procedural due process had been met by the
administrative agency in the latter's hearing.15 Such an investiga-
tion could look into the jurisdiction of the agency, reasonable notice,
opportunity for a fair hearing, and whether findings were sup-
ported by evidence."6 More recent cases have gone into some of the
specifics of due process. In Salerno v. Board of Dental Examiners,"7
the license of a dentist, Dr. Salerno, was revoked by the Board of
Dental Examiners because he had unlawfully employed an un-
licensed dentist to perform dental operations. Although he requested
a written transcript of his hearing in order to prepare for appeal,
appellant was not given such a transcript. He contended on appeal
that the Board's decision should be overturned on grounds of denial
of due process. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the Board, partly because Dr. Salerno had failed to show that he
had been prejudiced by not being furnished a copy of the transcript.
Such a showing is mandatory under the Georgia administrative
212 WYo. §9-276.32(c).
21 500 P.2d 585 (Wyo. 1972).
7"WyO. 99-276.32(c).
2
1 5 Middlesboro v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 252 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1952); Michigan Bell
Tel. Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 332 Mich. 7, 50 N.W.2d 326 (1962); Dunaway
v. Torline, 90 Ohio App. 516, 105 N.E.2d 75 (1951), appeal dismissed, 156 Ohio St.
16"Russell v. Johnson, 220 Ind. 649, 46 N.B.2d 219 (1943); State ex rel. Ball v. McPhee,
6 Wis. 2d 190,94 N.W,2d 711 (1959).
n? 119 Ga. App- 743, 168 S.E.2d 875 (1969), cert. denied, 119 Ga. App. 890 (1969).
535, 103 N.E.2d 576 (1952).
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procedure act.218 Thus it can be seen that the denial of due process
may be grounds for reversal of an administrative agency decision
only if such denial was prejudicial to the appellant.
In Monahan v. Board of Trustees, County of Freemont,21 denial
of due process was one ground for reversal of an agency decision.
There a teacher sought review of the action of the school district
Board of Trustees in terminating his employment. Due process was
lacking in that the attorney for the Board acted as both presiding
officer and prosecutor. As presiding officer he ruled on objections,
including his own. Such denial of due process was held grounds for
reversal under the Wyoming administrative procedure act.'
Most jurisdictions allow the reviewing courts to inquire into the
evidentiary basis of the decision, findings, or order reached by the
administrative agency. The jurisdictions differ, however, on exactly
what evidentiary basis is proper.
Nineteen states and the District of Columbia provide that the
agency action should be supported by "substantial evidence." Eigh-
teen of these jurisdictions list a substantial evidence test in their
administrative procedure acts ;221 the remaining two states, Arizona 2 2
and Illinois 223 have adopted the substantial evidence test in their com-
mon law. Typical substantial evidence provisions in states' adminis-
trative procedure acts provide that the reviewing court may reverse if
the agency decision is not based on "substantial evidence in light of the
whole record" (California, Arkansas, Arizona, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Mexico, District of Columbia, Wyoming, Wiscon-
sin). Other states provide that the evidence must be "competent,
material, and substantial" (Michigan, Nebraska) or "competent
and substantial" (Missouri).
A different test is provided by twelve other states wherein the
reviewing court may not reverse unless the decision of the admin-
istrative agency was "clearly erroneous."' 4 Typical statutes read
"clearly erroneous in view of reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record" (Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana,
Montana, Nevada), or just "clearly erroneous" (Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Washington).
218 GA. §3A-120 (h).
1
19486 P.2d 235 (Wyo. 1971).
1 WYo. §9-276.32(c),
21 Alas., Ark., Cal-, DC., Fla-, Ind-, Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Neb., N.M., N.D., Ore., Pa.,
Va., Wis., Wyo.
22Talley v. Paradise Memorial Gardens, Inc., 107 Ariz. 585, 491 P.2d 439 (1971).
2 Lee v. Police Board of City of Chicago, 218 N.E.2d 783 (111. App. 1966).
"'Colo., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho, La., Md., Mont., Nev., Okla., R.I., S.D., Wash.
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What is the difference between the two tests? The "clearly
erroneous" test is thought to give reviewing courts broader powers
of review than those courts bound by the "substantial evidence"
test. As emminent an authority as Frank Cooper admits that the dis-
tinction between the two tests is blurred. 25 We shall attempt to
sort out the similarities and differences by reviewing the case law.
Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean a preponderance
of the evidence.2 26 In the Monahan case, 227 the reviewing court found
that good cause should have been shown by the School Board in
terminating the teacher's employment. It was held that the Board
needed substantial evidence to show such cause, and the teacher's
dismissal was reversed because there was not sufficient information
before the Board to constitute substantial evidence. The "substantial
evidence" test was met in the King case," in part by the testimony
of several credible witnesses who noted what the duties of the Land
Board were, and also by the enabling act itself, so as to prove juris-
diction. In Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Hilliard,'" the Wyoming Equal-
ization Board assessed the railway an amount equal to a percentage
of its property as a one-year tax assessment. The Wyoming Supreme
Court reversed the Equalization Board on the ground that the "sub-
stantial evidence" test had not been met; the Board had computed the
assessment utilizing a formula based upon the operations of a rail-
road other than plaintiff. The court held that the Board did not have
substantial evidence before it to conclude that its indicators of
economic change equally affected all operating railroads. In the
Wisconsin case of Columbus Milk Producers Co-op. v. Department
of Agriculture,"' there was presentation of substantial evidence that
a trade custom existed whereby the state could pay out claims
against a milk co-operative utilizing for that purpose security funds
paid into the state by the co-operative. This presentation of sub-
stantial evidence allowed the Wisconsin Supreme Court to pay out
similar funds in the present case under the same trade custom. The
court cited the Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act as control-
ling the evidentiary question.31
22 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 733-56 (1965).
22 State ex el. Rockwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 213 Minn. 184, 6 N.W.2d 251 (1942).
227 Monahan v. Board of Trustees, County of Freemont, 486 P.2d 235 (Wyo. 1971).
2 King v. White, 500 P.2d 585 (Wyo. 1972).
229 502 P.2d 189 (Wyo. 1972).
23048 Wis. 451, 180 N.W.2d 617 (1970).
31Wis. §227.20(1).
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The "clearly erroneous" test leaves the reviewing court more
latitude than the "substantial evidence" test. The court of appeals
of the state of Washington adopted the United States Supreme Court
definition of the "clearly erroneous" test232 in a case which disallowed
a claim for unemployment compensation.
Although there is evidence to support a finding, the review-
ing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 33
The Washington Supreme Court has also directly compared the two
tests in scope. Ancheta v. Daly"' involved a labor dispute in which
Union A struck Employer X; Union B opposed the strike and did
not walk out. Members of Union B applied for unemployment com-
pensation when they were laid off because of the strike, but their
claims were disallowed by the Employment Security Department on
grounds that their lack of work was due to a work stoppage caused
by a labor dispute, The Washington Supreme Court affirmed a lower
court reversal of the agency decision, holding that judicial review
of the decisions of administrative agencies were now governed by
the Washington Administrative Procedure Act"5 which allowed courts
the broader review of the "clearly erroneous" test rather than the
narrower review of the "substantial evidence" test. South Dakota
also upheld the "clearly erroneous" test set forth in its adminis-
trative procedure act'36 in Application of Ed Phillips & Sons Co.117
There the state Revenue Commissioner refused to allow transfer
of the stock of a wholesale liquor company because of his holding
that it was not in the public interest to allow respondent to enter
the wholesale liquor market. The lower court reversed the commis-
sioner on grounds that there was not substantial evidence in the
hearing before the Commissioner that the respondent was not re-
liable and of good moral character. The South Dakota Supreme
Court reversed the lower court and affirmed the Commissioner's
decision, stating that the trial court should have reversed or modified
only if the agency findings were clearly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.
Nine states have no specific evidentiary test outlined in their
administrative procedure acts. 38
nz United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
mTunget v. State Employment Security Dept., 2 Wash. App. 574, 468 P.2d 734, 737 (1970).
-"461 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1969).
"I WASH. §34.04.130(6).
'6 S.D. §1-26-36.
37 195 N.W.2d 400, 405 (S.D. 1972).
'33 Conn., Iowa, Ken., Ky., Me., NJ., Ohio, Vt., W.Va
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The majority of states provide that a reviewing court may
reverse the decision of an administrative agency if such decision
was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Nineteen juris-
dictions so provide in their administrative procedure acts.23 9. Two
other states, Arizona 20 and Illinois,241 have decided this issue in
their common law, allowing reversal for these causes. Eight states
allow reversal if the agency decision was arbitrary or capricious,
but their administrative procedure acts make no mention of abuse
of discretion. 2 Two other states provide for reversal if the admin-
istrative agency's decision was an abuse of discretion, but their acts
make no mention of decisions which are arbitrary or capricious.""
In all, thirty-one jurisdictions make some provision for reversal for
one or for a combination of these factors. Ten states have no specific
provision in this area.'"
If the administrative agency's action is wilful and unreason-
ing,245 it has been deemed arbitrary and capricious. Arbitrary action
is the result of an untconsidered, wilful, or irrational choice.24 6 A
recent case in the federal courts, Daly v. Volpe,27 defines an agency
action as arbitrary or capricious only if it is so clearly erroneous
that it has no rationally supportable basis.
In Monahan v. Board of Trustees, County of Freemont,2 the
reviewing court held that where due process was lacking, and where
the administrative agency did not have sufficient information before
it to fulfill the substantial evidence test, the agency's termination of
the teacher's employment was arbitrary.
"
5 Ark., Colo., D.C., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho, Ind., La., Mich., Mont., Nev., N.M., N.D., Pa., R.I.,
S.D., Va., W. Va., Wyo.
24 Courts may grant review upon a party's sufficient showing of abuse of discrction or arbitrary
or capricious action by an agency. Peters v. Frye, 71 Ariz. 30, 223 P.2d 176 (1950).
14' Where the agency's decision was not arbitrary or capricious or against the manifest weight
of the evidence, a court could not interfere with agency's discretionary authority. Wedeberg
v. Department of Regis. and Educ., 94 11. App.2d 451, 237 N.E.2d 557 (1968). Courts
will not interfere with the exercise of the agency's powers unless such exercise is shown to
be capricious or arbitrary. Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Twp. High School Dist. 205, 36
11.2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), where the Supreme Court
held that a reviewing court may examine the evidence independently and may afford little
weight to the factual determinations of the Board of Education where the state courts never
gave de ovo review to the evidence.
242 Md., Mass., Minn., Mo., Neb., Okla., Wash., Wis.
23Alas., Cal.
24 Conn., Fla., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Me., N.J., Ohio, Ore., Vt.
2SJabs v. State Bd. of Personnel, 34 Wis.2d 245, 148 N.W.2d 853 (1966); Marathon Oil
Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 473 P.2d 575 (Wyo. 1970).
2 Robertson Trans. Co. v. Public Scrv. Comm'n., 39 Wis.
2 d 653, 159 N.W.2d 636 (1968).
27350 F.Supp. 252 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
20486 P.2d 235 (Wyo. 1971).
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An arbitrary ruling by an administrative agency may be the
basis for a modification of the agency's order on review. In Arkansas
State Board of Pharmacy v. Patrick,249 the Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Board in punishing a pharmacist who
had refilled an empty prescription container without authorization
from the prescribing physician. The court held, however, that the
Board's order of revocation of the pharmacist's license was arbitrary,
and the order was modified to a one year suspension of his license.
Abuse of discretion must be pleaded, 250 and the burden of proof is
on the appellant to show that he was prejudiced by any abuse of
discretion.25 1
Possible Action by the Reviewing Court
The alternatives left to the reviewing court, by statute, for dis-
position of an appealed decision of an administrative agency are
illustrated by the following chart.
AFFIRM REVERSE SET ASIDE VACATE MODIFY REMAND
Alas.
44.62.570 X X X X
Ariz.
12-911 X X X X
Ark.
5-713 X X X X
Cal.
1094.5 (d) X X X
Colo.
3-16-5 X X X
Conn.
[None listed]
D.C.
1-1510 X X
Fla.
120.31(2) X X
Ga.
3A-120(h) X X X X
Hawaii
9-14(g) x x x x
249243 Ark. 967, 423 S.W.2a 265 (1968).
5 0Neel v. Laramie, 488 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1971).
21 East Camelback Homeowners Ass'n. v. Arizona Foundation for Neurology & Psychiatry, 1
Ariz. App. 121, 500 P.2d 906 (1972).
1973]
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AFFIRM REVERSE SET ASIDE VACATE MODIFY REMAND
Idaho
67-5215 (g) X X X X
Ill.
110-275 X X X
Ind.
63-3018 X X X
Iowa
[None listed]
Kan.
77-434 X
Ky.
[None listed]
La.
49:964 X X X X
Me.
2451 X X X X
Md.
41-255 X X X X
Mass.
30A-14(8) X X X X
Mich.
24.306(2) X X X X X
Minn.
15.0425 X X X X
Mo.
536.140 X X X X
Mont.
82-4216 X X X X
Neb.
84-917(6) X X X X
Nev.
23313.140 X X X X
N.J.
[Not listed]
N.M.
4-32-21 x x X, x
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AFFIRM REVERSE SET ASIDE VACATE MODIFY REMAND
N. D.
28-32-19 X X X
Ohio
119.12 X X X X X
Okla.
75-322 X X X X X
Ore.
183.480(7) X X X
Pa.
71-1710.44 X X X X
R. I.
42-35-15 X X X X
S.D.
1-26-36 X X X X
Vt.
VRCP 74(e) As In Any Usual Case Before a County Court
Va.
9-6.13(g) X X X X
Wash.
34.04.130 (b) X X X
W. Va.
29A-5-4 (g) X X X X X
Wis.
227.20(1) X X X
Wyo.
[None listed]
Further Judicial Appeal
While some jurisdictions have no express provision for further
judicial appeal, 253 most states provide that further appeal may be
taken as in other civil cases.5 3 Indiana takes this approach one step
22 Twelve of the jurisdictions considered have administrative procedure statutes with no ex-
press provision for further judicial appeal; Ark., Colo., Conn., D.C., Fla., Iowa., Kan., Ky.,
Mich., N.J., N.M., and Ohio.
253 ALAS. §44.62.560; IDAHO §67-5216; LA. §49:965; ME. tit. 5, §2451; MD. Art. 41, §256;
MINN. §15.0426; Mo. §536.140; MONT. §82-4217; NEB. §84-918; NEV. §2335B.150;
OKLA, tit. 75, §323; PA. tit. 71, §1710.47; S.D. §1-26-37; VA. §9-6.14; W. VA. §29A-6-1;
Wyo. §9-276.33.
19731
37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
further by stipulating that the appeal may not be prosecuted unless
notice of the appellant's intention to appeal is filed with the appellate
court within fifteen days of the date of the judgment and an appeal
bond is posted.2
Other varieties of provision for further judicial appeal exist:
two states provide for further judicial appeal in accordance with
their respective rules of civil procedure;25S two states provide for
further appeal in the same manner as in equity suits;26 two states
provide for such appeal, at the appellate court's discretion, by way
of certiorari;257 North Dakota authorizes further judicial appeal in
its Supreme Court in the same manner as any case tried without a
jury provided such appeal is prosecuted within three months after
the service of the notice of entry of judgment in the district
court;22 Georgia simply provides for further review as provided by
law;"' Illinois merely states that further review may be had in
accordance with its state constitution ;210 and finally, three states
provide for further appeal by simply designating which court is
the proper forum for such appeal. 61
The fact that further judicial review is provided in the ma-
jority of jurisdictions renders most of the differences among the
state statutes involving further judicial appeal relatively unimpor-
tant in that such review should presumably satisfy the basic elements
of fairness and procedural due process. The interesting fact is that
ten jurisdictions have no provision whatsoever for such review.
However, where a state's administrative procedure act does not
specifically preclude such further review and does not indicate a
legislative intent to withhold further judicial review, an appropri-
ate appellate court may be held to have jurisdiction under the state's
general statutes relating to appeals.16'
Liability of Administrative Officials
Administrative procedure legislation among the states is unan-
imously silent regarding the civil or criminal liability of an admin-
istrative agency official for his malfeasance or nonfeasance in the
254 IND. §63-3018.
255CAL, CV. PRO. CODE §1094.5; HAWAII §91-15.
m MAss. ch. 30A §15; Oi. §183.480.
2
s
TARIZ. §12-913; R.I. §42-35-16.
-N.D. §28-32-21.
259 GA. §3A-121.
260 ILL, ch. 110, §276.
251 VT. tit. 3 §815; WASH. §34.04.130; WIS §227.33.
2 22 Am. Jur.2d Administrative Law §769 (1962). The question of legislative intent of a par-
ticular state relating to the absence of an administrative procedure statute provision for
further judicial review is beyond the scope of this note.
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course of making an administrative determination. 63 The absence
of a statutory provision imposing liability on an administrative of-
ficial does not necessarily indicate that such official will not be held
liable for his malfeasance or nonfeasance, because the common law
may impose such liability6 4 The general common law rule is that a
public official will not be held personally liable for his error or mis-
take in making an adjudicatory determination so long as he was
acting within his jurisdiction and in good faith.2 s
Although California's administrative procedure legislation pro-
vides for the imposition of personal liability upon an agency official
for his malfeasance,2 6 such malfeasance is not of the type referred
to immediately above in that to be subject to California's statu-
tory imposition of liability of a fine and imprisonment, the mal-
feasance must be the intentional refusal to obey a court mandate
rather than malfeasance in the course of making an administrative
determination.267
Nancy J. Balzert
Michael S. Goldsteint
David S. King
William H. Rider, Jr.t
Howard E. Roset
263 Although no specific provision was included in any of the administrative procedure statutes
reviewed, there may be other vehides through which liabilities on officials may be imposed.
Such other vehicles are generally beyond the scope of this note.
2612 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 641 (1965).
" 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law §799 (1962).
266 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1094.8.
267 Jd.
t Law Review Candidate, second year student, The Cleveland State UDiversity College of Law.
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